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Abstract
It has been argued by several philosophers that a deflationary conception of truth,
unlike more robust conceptions of truth, cannot properly account for the nature of moral
discourse.  This is due to what I will call the “quick route problem”: There is a quick
route from any deflationary theory of truth and certain obvious features of moral practice
to the attribution of truth to moral utterances. The standard responses to the quick route
problem are either to urge accepting a conception of truth more robust than deflationism
(Boghossian 1990), or to revise deflationary accounts in order to block straightforward
attribution of truth to moral utterances (Field 1994).  I contend that neither of these
standard responses is well-motivated, for it is a merit of deflationary accounts rather than
a defect that such accounts present a quick route to moral truth.
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It has been argued by several philosophers that a deflationary conception of truth,
unlike more robust conceptions of truth, cannot properly account for the nature of moral
discourse.  This is due to what I will call the “quick route problem”: There is a quick
route from any deflationary theory of truth and certain obvious features of moral practice
to the attribution of truth to moral utterances.  Due to this quick route from deflationism
to moral truth, any such deflationary conception is supposed to preclude the possibility of
2formulating an “anti-realist,” “expressivist,” “projectivist,” or “non-factualist” account of
ethics.  Whether any one of these meta-ethical “isms” is a correct or incorrect view
should, these philosophers contend, be a matter for serious debate, not a matter settled in
a trivial manner by a theory of truth.
Focus on the question of whether or not deflationary accounts of truth rule out
certain meta-ethical theories has resulted in insufficient attention being given to the
question of how coherent the account of moral truth purportedly essential to these “isms”
actually is, and whether this account of moral truth could be accepted without doing a
great deal of harm to our commonsense approach to moral talk as well as our
philosophical theories of morality.
In this paper, I will briefly review the features and advantages of three prominent
deflationary theories of truth: disquotationalism, prosententialism, and the minimalist
theory.  Then I will show how each of these theories is open to the quick route problem.
Much of the attention in the recent literature has been focused on the minimalist theory,
but it ought to be noted that the quick route problem is not only the minimalist’s burden.
The standard responses to the quick route problem are either to urge accepting a
conception of truth more robust than deflationism (Boghossian 1990), or to revise
deflationary accounts in order to block straightforward attribution of truth to moral
utterances (Field 1994).  I contend that neither of these standard responses is well-
motivated, for it is a merit of deflationary accounts rather than a defect that such accounts
present a quick route to moral truth.
3Inflationism and Correspondence
It is worth noting that there are quite good reasons to accept a deflationary
conception of truth that stand apart from the considerations related to moral discourse
raised in this paper.  An inflationary theory is a theory that identifies truth with a
property, and then provides an analysis of the underlying nature of that property.  On the
paradigmatic inflationary account, the correspondence theory of truth, the property of
being true is identified with the property of being a proposition that corresponds to the
facts.  This rough characterization obviously requires further characterization itself.
Spelling out what a fact is, and what it would be for a proposition to correspond to such a
thing, is a major task of the correspondence theory.  Exactly what a fact is and what it
would mean for a proposition to correspond to a fact is obscure.  Is a fact some sort of
sentence-shaped object in the world?  Is the correspondence some kind of resemblance?
What are the criteria of identity for facts?  Can a correspondence theorist avoid the
notorious slingshot argument (Davidson 1984)?  Is it the case that if a sentence
corresponds to any fact at all, it corresponds to all facts?
In order to clarify some of these obscurities, philosophers influenced by Hartry
Field’s classic paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” have attempted to spell out the nature of
this correspondence not in terms of facts but in terms of the reference of subsentential
units.  These referential relations are then, in turn, explained in terms of a causal theory
of reference.  The philosophers carrying out this project have run into serious difficulties.
How does one assure that the causal links between a term such as ‘Earth’ and the Earth
itself are specified in the proper way to explain reference?  How does a causal theorist of
reference distinguish appropriate causal chains from inappropriate causal chains?
4Complex theories presented by philosophers such as Fred Dretske (1988) and Jerry Fodor
(1990) attempting to specify the proper causal link between words and the world have
been found lacking
1
.
The case of moral truth raises a particular worry for the correspondence theorist,
especially the correspondence theorist who appeals to a causal theory of reference.  If
such a philosopher were inclined to think moral utterances are capable of being true or
false, that philosopher would be forced into accepting what would be widely regarded to
be an implausible account of the metaphysics of morality.  Only a certain group of
philosophers, the naturalistic “moral realists,” think that moral properties are properties
that figure into causal relations (Boyd 1988, Railton 1986).  Philosophers who hold
“expressivist” and “constructivist” views, as well as many others impressed by arguments
dating back to Hume (2000) and Moore (1903), are skeptical of the claim that moral
properties such as goodness, virtue, and justice are invoked in causal explanations and
laws.  Any correspondence theorist inclined to accept that moral utterances can be true or
false would have to answer the Humean, Moorean arguments against naturalism, a major
burden.  Thus it is worth noting here that it is the inflationary, correspondence account
that would be in conflict with a range of meta-ethical views that follow Hume and Moore
in rejecting naturalistic moral realism.
Deflationary Theories
Philosophers who have been skeptical of the analyses given by inflationary
theories such as the correspondence theory have asked whether it is a mistake to assume
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 Barry Loewer (1987) details the problems presented by misrepresentation for Dretske’s
theory, and Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (1994) raise serious problems for Fodor’s
attempted resolution of the misrepresentation problem.
5that there is a property of truth with a substantial underlying nature.  Is it necessary to
give such an account of the property of truth in order to explain the function of the
predicate ‘true’?  Or is there a different account that fully explains the function of this
predicate?  If one can give a full account of the function of the truth term without
reference to one of these vexed, incomplete theories of the underlying nature of truth,
why would any further theorizing be required?
The summaries I will present below will, I hope, make it clear that regardless of
the application of the label ‘deflationist’ to these theories, there are significant differences
among these theories of truth.  Each of these theories takes a different position on the role
of the truth predicate.  These theories differ on the issue of whether or not truth is a
property.  Some of these theories involve complexities such as appeals to substitutional
quantification, whereas others do not.  It is not uncommon to find objections raised
against particular deflationary theories that involve ignorance of the difference between
one deflationary theory and another.  For instance, the minimalist theory is sometimes
criticized for denying that there is a property of truth, even though Horwich (1998b) quite
clearly claims that minimalism holds that there is a property of truth.
While these theories may differ in important respects, there are certain features
these theories have in common that give rise to the issues I will discuss in this paper.  As
I will explain in detail in the sections following the summaries, all of these theories share
the feature of trivializing the distinction between asserting that p and asserting that p is
true.  This shared feature, as noted above, plays a significant role in the debates over truth
and its relation to meta-ethical controversies.
The Disquotational Theory of Truth
6Unlike a Tarskian account of truth, the disquotational theory of truth proposed by
W.V. Quine (1970, 1992) and Field (1986) does not require that truth be accounted for in
terms of satisfaction, denotation, and recursive rules for sentence construction.  Rather,
this account claims, as Quine puts it, that “truth is disquotation” (Quine 1992, 80).  For
any sentence in a language, ‘p’ is true iff p.  One can appeal to truth in order to disquote
the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side of this biconditional. This fact, also noted by
the Tarskian theory, is regarded as basic on the disquotational account, requiring no
further explanation.  Anyone with a grasp of the notion of truth will understand that D1
and similar instances of the disquotational schema are acceptable:
D1: ‘The Earth moves’ is true iff the Earth moves.
The disquotational theory, unlike the minimalist account (discussed below), does
not appeal to propositions as the vehicle of truth.  The vehicle of truth on the
disquotational account is a class of sentences, the eternal sentences.  Eternal sentences are
context-independent sentences.  This requirement is a significant one for this account.
For instance, it would be troublesome if the left side of the following schema instance
were read relative to one context (say, July 21, 2004) and the right side of the
biconditional were read relative to another (July 20, 2004):
D2: ‘It is Tuesday today’ is true iff it is Tuesday today.
Thus the only proper candidate sentences for instances of the disquotational schema are
eternal sentences, sentences with truth values not dependent upon context, such as ‘July
20, 2004 is a Tuesday.’  The attribution of truth to sentences only, and not to
propositions, is appealing to philosophers who are dubious of the existence of
propositions.
7Unlike a redundancy theory of truth, the disquotational account does not assume
that the notion of truth plays no significant role in the language.  On this account, it is
correctly noted that truth plays the important role of allowing one to formulate
generalizations about true sentences.  For instance, it would be impossible for a
redundancy theorist to account for the fact that all sentences with the logical form p∨~p
are true.  One can only assert particular instances of this schema, p∨~p, and attribution of
truth to particular instances of this schema are eliminable redundancies.  The
disquotational account allows one to semantically ascend from each instance of the
schema p∨~p to the metalinguistic level.  Take particular instances such as: ‘the Yankees
will win the World Series ∨ the Yankees will not win the World Series’ and ‘the Red Sox
will win the World Series ∨ the Red Sox will not win the World Series’.  We can then
ascend, via the disquotational schema, to the metalinguistic level to assert that ‘The
Yankees will win the World Series ∨ the Yankees will lose the World Series’ is true,
along with all of the other instances of this schema.  Such semantic ascent allows one to
assert that the conjunction of all instances of this schema p∨~p are true.  By allowing for
the construction of such infinite conjunctions, the disquotational account explains the
important role played by attributions of truth.
The disquotational account only explains one class of attributions of truth, namely
attribution of truth to sentences.  How are we to explain other attributions of truth, such
as attribution of truth to beliefs?  One possible way to do so is to claim that truth is
attributed to the propositions expressed by these beliefs.  However, if a disquotational
theorist appeals to propositions, then there is no significant difference between this
account and the minimalist theory discussed below.
8A merit of minimalism that is not shared by the disquotational theory is that the
disquotational theory cannot explain how we can apply the notion of truth to sentences
that we do not understand.  A speaker can only comprehend instances of the schema
spelled out in her own language; A monolingual English speaker would not know why it
is that ‘Schnee ist weiss’ is true iff schnee ist weiss.  For this reason, Field restricts the
theory of truth to a specific set of utterances, “only…utterances a person understands”
(Field 1994, 405).  This limitation in the ability of the disquotational theory to explain the
concept of truth—limiting the concept to one that only applies to the utterances one
understands—is a consequence of the disquotational theorist’s refusal to countenance
propositions.  Without such restrictions, other theories such as minimalism can avoid this
limitation of the disquotational theory.
The Prosentential Theory of Truth
The prosentential theorist, like the disquotational theorist, provides an account of
the role of the truth predicate in a language.  The most significant difference between the
prosentential theory and all of the other deflationary theories of truth is the distinctive
account the prosentential theorist gives of the role played by the truth predicate.  The
prosentential theory claims that assertions such as ‘That is true’ have a function
analogous to pronouns.
On one reading of sentence AP, the pronoun ‘he’ is an anaphoric pronoun:
AP: Derek knew that he needed to hit a home run.
The pronoun ‘he’ has the same referent as its antecedent, the name ‘Derek.’  It obtains
this referent by being anaphorically dependent upon the antecedent.  In addition to
anaphoric pronouns, as Grover, Camp, and Belnap (1975) point out, there are anaphoric
9proadjectives, such as ‘so’ in the following quotation from Alexander Pope: “To make
men happy and to keep them so” (Grover, Camp, and Belnap 1975, 84).  The expression
‘so’ essentially plays the same role in this sentence as a second occurrence of ‘happy’
would play, describing how the men being discussed by Pope are kept.  The word ‘so’
inherits its meaning from its antecedent, ‘happy.’  In the following discourse, DIS1, ‘That
is true’ is, according to the prosentential theory, a prosentence:
DIS1:
Galileo: The Earth moves.
Castelli: That is true.
The prosentence ‘That is true,’ asserted by Castelli, is anaphorically dependent upon its
antecedent, Galileo’s assertion ‘The Earth moves.’  Just as the pronoun ‘he’ in AP
inherits its content from its antecedent and the proadjective ‘so’ in the Pope quotation
inherits its content from the adjective ‘happy,’ according to prosententialism the
prosentence ‘That is true’ has the same content as its antecedent.  Thus, in this context,
‘That is true’ means that the Earth moves.
The prosentential theory has to contend with one of the difficulties that plagued
the redundancy theory of truth.  The bare-bones prosentential theory summarized above
does not have the resources to explain the meaning of sentences such as K1:
K1: What Kerry said about the Iraq war is true.
In order to explain such occurrences of the truth term, Grover, Camp, and Belnap (1975)
claim that the English sentence K1 is equivalent to the sentence K2:
K2: For each proposition regarding the Iraq war if Kerry said that it is true then it
is true.
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As Paul Horwich has pointed out, in order to explain why K1 and K2 are equivalent, one
would appeal to the fact that ‘true,’ pace the prosentential theory, is a genuine logical
predicate.  For K1 is equivalent to saying:
If Kerry said, regarding Iraq, that p, then p.
We can then use the minimalist theory (detailed below) to expand this into:
If Kerry said, regarding Iraq, that <p> is true, then <p> is true.
This expansion is equivalent to K2, but the explanation of how we derived K2 from K1
relies on the resources of the minimalist theory, and, as noted above, relies on
considering ‘true’ a genuine predicate.
The Minimalist Theory of Truth
Minimalism is the view that the meaning of the term ‘true’ in English (and the
meanings of similar terms in other languages) is best analyzed in terms of a fact
regarding the use of the term by speakers of the English language.  The meaning of ‘true’
is explained fundamentally by the acceptance of a trivial schema T:
T:  <p> is true iff p.
In the schema, ‘<p>’ is short for ‘the proposition that p.’
Speakers of English are inclined to accept, for any given proposition, <p>, that
the proposition that p is true iff p.  According to minimalism, the fact that speakers accept
instances of such a schema explains the purpose of the notion of truth, which is to allow
one to form generalizations such as ‘Everything the president said in his speech was true’
and ‘All instances of ‘if p, then p’ are true.’  The generalizing role of truth is the sole
purpose of the notion of truth.  No further facts, beyond acceptance of the schema, are
required in order to specify the meaning of the term ‘true.’
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For reasons that I have discussed above in the sections on the competing
deflationary theories of truth, minimalism has a number of advantages over its
competitors.  Regardless of these differences, as I have noted, there is one key similarity
between all deflationary theories.  Each deflationary theory makes trivial the distinction
between asserting that p and asserting that it is true that p.  Whether or not this
trivialization of this distinction is troubling will be considered below.
Attribution, Denial, Anomaly
An extensively discussed question in the philosophical field of meta-ethics,
primarily in the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century, is whether utterances pertaining to normative
matters generally and moral matters specifically are capable of being either
straightforwardly true or straightforwardly false.  This question has been raised due to the
view, held by many philosophers, that there a significant difference between the class of
nonnormative and nonmoral utterances, such as ‘The Earth moves’ and ‘Albany is the
capital of New York State’ and the class of normative and moral utterances such as ‘Rape
is wrong,’ ‘Great inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust,’ and ‘One should be
polite in the company of strangers.’  This view is due to the wide-spread belief that a
characterization of the semantic difference between moral/normative discourse and
nonmoral/nonnormative discourse is required in order to characterize the difference
between moral/normative matters and nonmoral/nonnormative matters.
One could take one of several positions in response to aforementioned question
regarding the truth or falsehood of moral and normative utterances.  One could hold that
such utterances are either true or false, and therefore in this respect do not differ from the
nonmoral and nonnormative utterances.  One could hold that such utterances are neither
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true nor false, and thus differ from the nonmoral and nonnormative utterances in this
respect.  Or, one could hold that such sentences are capable of being true or false, but are
true or false in some distinctive way that indicates the difference between
normative/moral utterances and nonnormative/ nonmoral utterances.
One way to spell out this third option, to offer a distinctive kind of truth
attribution to these utterances, would be to hold a relativist view.  Such a view holds that
normative and moral utterances are true or false only relative to a particular individual or
social perspective.  Another way to spell out such a view would be to claim that the
theory of truth for normative and moral utterances differs from the theory one would give
for other utterances, as Wright (1992) claims.
In order to simplify the subsequent discussion of this issue and avoid repetition, I
will use the following terms to refer to the theses discussed in the previous paragraph.  I
will call the approach that allows for the straightforward attribution of truth and
falsehood to normative and moral utterances the Attribution Thesis.  The view denying
that truth and falsehood can be attributed to normative and moral utterances will
henceforth be called the Denial Thesis.  Finally, the theories calling for truth and
falsehood of a distinct kind to be attributed to normative and moral utterances will be
called instances of the Anomaly Thesis.
The Quick Route to Attribution
On a deflationary theory of truth, including any of the three deflationary theories
discussed above, it would seem that there is a fairly quick route from the fact that people
make sincere moral assertions to the Attribution Thesis.  Using the resources of any of
these theories, one can show that the inference from an assertion that p to the assertion
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that p is true is a trivial one.  Thus as soon as one commits oneself to holding that rape is
wrong, one would also commit oneself to hold (if one has a grasp of the notion of truth)
that it is true that rape is wrong.
I will show that there is such a quick route on any deflationary theory of truth, and
I will offer several arguments for regarding this as a merit of these deflationary theories
rather than a defect.
The Quick Route: The Disquotational Theory
The disquotational theory, as I mentioned above, accounts for truth without
making appeal, as a Tarskian theories does, to principles regarding predicate satisfaction,
denotation, and the role of connectives.  It does, however, regard T schema instances
along the lines of TR as basic:
TR: ‘Rape is wrong’ is true if and only if rape is wrong.
Thus, given that ‘Rape is a wrong’ is a meaningful sentence, the disquotational schema
can be applied to a sincere assertion of ‘Rape is wrong’ to show that truth ought to be
attributed by that person to the sentence ‘Rape is wrong.’
The Quick Route: The Prosentential Theory
For the prosentential theorist, the quick route from sincere moral assertion to the
Attribution Thesis is illustrated by the fact that purported prosentences can be and often
are used in contexts where moral assertions are the antecedents of such prosentences.
Thus if Larry asserts that ‘Great inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust,’ and
Barry responds ‘That is true,’ what does Barry’s assertion mean?  On the prosentential
account, as noted above, Barry’s utterance is anaphorically dependent upon Larry’s
utterance, and thus his assertion ‘That is true’ has the same meaning as ‘Great
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inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust.’  There is no reason to think that we
cannot use the resources of the prosentential theory to form prosentences anaphorically
dependent upon moral and normative utterances in just the same way we use these
resources to form prosentences anaphorically dependent upon nonmoral and
nonnormative utterances.
The Quick Route: The Minimalist Theory
On the minimalist theory, unlike some theories such as disquotationalism and
prosententialism, truth is attributed not directly to sentences, but rather to propositions.
So, in order to establish that there is a quick route from sincere assertions to the
Attribution Thesis on the minimalist theory, we first have to ask whether we should
regard moral utterances as assertions that involve the expression of propositions.
On the assumption that an utterance such as ‘Rape is wrong’ expresses a mental
state with propositional content, we would take the utterance to express the proposition
that rape is wrong.  Is there a reason to reject the claim that the mental state expressed in
this situation does express such a proposition?  Are such utterances not meaningful?  Do
we not use them in all of the ordinary contexts in which we also use meaningful
utterances?  The prima facie correct view is that moral utterances do in fact express
propositions.
There is some historical precedent for rejecting the prima facie view that moral
utterances express propositions.  A.J. Ayer, in his account of moral language in
Language, Truth, and Logic, claims that moral utterances do not express propositions for
they are unverifiable.  Given that there are no propositions expressed by such utterances,
and truth is a property of propositions, then moral utterances are not capable of being true
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or false
2
.  The contemporary deflationist need not accept the verificationist commitments
of Ayer’s account, hence the deflationist ought not to claim that moral utterances fail to
express propositions.
If an utterance of ‘Rape is wrong’ does express the proposition that rape is wrong,
then the following would be an instance of the minimalist truth schema:
TR: <Rape is wrong> is true iff rape is wrong.
Thus, any speaker with an understanding of the notion of truth, according to the
minimalist theory, would be able to recognize that the claim that it is true that rape is
wrong is a consequence of the truth schema and that rape is wrong.  Thus, on the
minimalist theory, there is a quick route from asserting that p to asserting that p is true.
Should We Avoid the Quick Route?
If these deflationary theories, along with our practice of moral discussion and
argument, give us good reason to affirm the Attribution Thesis, should we regard this as a
bad thing?  Without delving into the complex details of specific meta-ethical theories,
there are several arguments that can be put forward for regarding this quick route to the
Attribution Thesis as the appropriate road to take.
First, normative and moral assertions have all of the same surface features as
nonnormative and nonmoral assertions.  ‘Killing is wrong’ appears to attribute wrongness
to killing in just the same way that ‘The Earth is round’ attributes roundness to the Earth.
Taking this surface structure into consideration provides a prima facie reason for
regarding this moral utterance as similar in other respects to nonmoral utterances.
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 Boghossian claims that Ayer fails to notice a tension between an emotivist account of
ethics and a redundancy theory of truth.  This argument of Boghossian’s—a quite
influential argument—overlooks Ayer’s verificationist account of meaning and the role it
plays in blocking attribution of truth to moral utterances.
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As I will discuss below, some philosophical theories offer reasons to believe that
this surface appearance is misleading.  These theories claim that apparent moral
predications are not genuine predications.  On these theories, moral predicates are like
“sakes,” a well known example discussed in Quine 1960.  If I were to say that “I am
doing this for Susan’s sake,” it would be a mistake to think that this sentence involves
reference to some strange kind of entity, a sake.  An analysis of the meaning of this
sentence will show that no reference to sakes is required—what the sentence really means
is that I am doing this in order to help Susan.
A question that must be asked about any theory of the meaning of moral terms
that attempts to explain away the surface appearance that predicates such as ‘right,’
‘wrong,’ and ‘just’ are genuine predicates is whether it is reasonable to attribute such a
theory to ordinary speakers of a language.  One would suspect that no speaker of English
takes seriously the apparent reference to sakes in the examples discussed above, and this
fact is reflected in our use of the term.  Is this really the case with the moral predicates?
Is a semantics for moral predicates that regards them as something other than genuine
predicates really implicit in ordinary practice?
It is quite clear that moral predicates, unlike ‘sake,’ do not fit Quine’s description
of a defective noun.  Defective nouns, nouns that function as ‘sake’ does, have the
following features according to Quine:
…we never use ‘sake’ as antecedent of ‘it,’ nor do we predicate ‘sake’ of
anything.  ‘Sake’ figures in effect as an invariable fragment of a proposition ‘for
the sake of,’ or ‘for ‘s sake’ (Quine 1960, 236).
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Moral terms and predicates do not fit this description.  They do not appear only in a
restricted sort of context, or within certain idiomatic constructions.  Nouns that
purportedly denote moral properties can serve as the antecedent to pronouns:
AN: Lester cares a great deal about economic justice, but his brother Chester
could care less about it.
And, as has been discussed in this section, it is quite common to find ‘good’ or ‘just’ or
other normative and moral terms predicated of things and acts.
The opponent of the Attribution Thesis may attempt to defend her view by
holding that the ordinary speaker of the language is mistaken to regard apparent moral
predicates as genuine.  One could do this by offering an account that is not a descriptive
account of our ordinary practice, but rather a revisionary one, one that tells us what sort
of linguistic practice we ought to have.  It is important to note here that any motivation to
take such a revisionary route would, for reasons given above, have to be derived from a
variety of considerations not related to our actual linguistic practice, such as metaphysical
and psychological qualms.
In addition to sharing surface features with nonmoral discourse, attribution of
truth to moral utterances is required to account for the role such utterances play in
arguments.  Take an argument such as:
P1: If murdering innocent people is always wrong, then murdering a small group
of innocent people to save the lives of a larger number of innocent people is
wrong.
P2: Murdering innocent people is always wrong.
18
C: Murdering a small group of innocent people to save the lives of a larger
number of innocent people is wrong.
Such an argument certainly appears to have the form of a valid argument, an instance of
modus ponens.  However, if we reject the Attribution Thesis and hold the Denial Thesis,
one could not appeal to the truth of these claims and the form of the argument to explain
why the truth of these premises would lead, necessarily, to the truth of the conclusion.
Acceptance of the Denial Thesis would be tantamount to claiming that there is no
possibility of valid moral argument.
If some form of the Anomaly Thesis is held, there will also be serious difficulties
in accounting for the validity of moral arguments.  For, if the moral statements contained
in moral arguments are true in some different way from the nonmoral statements
contained in nonmoral arguments, then we need to appeal to a distinct notion of validity
that will reflect this distinct kind of truth.  Perhaps arguments containing moral
statements are valid in some different way from arguments that contain only nonmoral
statements.  This raises further perplexities.  Are arguments containing both moral and
nonmoral statements valid in one way, the other, or both?  A merit of the Attribution
Thesis is that, by attributing truth to normative and moral utterances of the same variety
as the truth that is attributed to nonnormative and nonmoral utterances, this thesis
requires no revision of our ordinary notion of validity.
That this is so would be a very important result for the philosophers who have
offered substantive solutions to the Frege-Geach embedding problem.  The very basis for
this problem is the worry that one cannot account for the validity of arguments containing
moral statements.  As G.F. Schueler (1988) points out in his criticism of Blackburn’s
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response to the embedding Problem, validity is a matter of the truth of the premises
necessitating the truth of the conclusion.  What purpose would account for validity be
without the attribution of truth to moral statements?  What would the purpose of the
accounts offered by expressivists such as Blackburn (1984, 1988) and Gibbard (1990) be
if moral arguments were not in fact genuinely valid ones?  Isn’t a solution to the Frege-
Geach problem intended to show why a moral argument is in fact valid and not an
instance of the fallacy of equivocation?
An analogous difficulty for the Denial Thesis is that in order to have a notion of
moral knowledge that accords well with our ordinary practice, we need to attribute truth
to moral utterances.  As Matthew Chrisman notes in his review of Gibbard’s Thinking
How to Live, ‘know’ is a factive verb—One cannot claim to know a proposition unless
that proposition is true.  The Denial Thesis
says that normative sentences are neither true nor false, so if that’s true, we cannot
have normative knowledge. Yet in a Moorean vein, one might reasonably think:
“Whatever I may or may not know about the semantics of normative language, I
damn well know that torturing children is wrong.” (Chrisman 2005, 408).
Thus the Denial Thesis creates a tension with our commonsense conception of moral
knowledge, whereas the Attribution Thesis does not.
Two further reasons for deflationists to assert the Attribution Thesis concern the
nature of the deflationary theories themselves, and some theoretical considerations
regarding the formulation of deflationism.  The deflationist is attempting to give a theory
that will capture the ordinary speaker’s notion of truth.  Also, the deflationary theories are
simple and elegant as originally stated.  I will discuss each of these considerations in turn.
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One of the central aims of deflationary theories is to avoid the difficulties that
have plagued previous attempts to define truth by offering an account that is based not on
an analysis of the underlying nature of the property of truth, but rather on the use of the
truth term by ordinary speakers of a language.  These characterizations of the use of the
truth term are clearly different on the various deflationary theories, but each theory
essentially has the same goal: to give a correct description of the use of the truth term.  In
giving such a description, these theories are not attempting (as noted above) to give a
revisionary account of the practice of attribution of truth to sentences or propositions.
The deflationists are not trying to explain a notion of truth that is only grasped by
philosophers after consideration of a wide range of metaphysical and epistemological
issues.
The philosophers who have advocated the Denial and Anomaly Theses, on the
other hand, have different goals and different approaches to characterizing the notion of
truth.  The central reasons for holding Denial and Anomaly Theses regarding truth in
some area of discourse are typically complex philosophical ones.  It would be
implausible, of course, to attribute an implicit grasp of such philosophical doctrines to the
ordinary speaker of the language.  Yet, if the proponents of the Denial and Anomaly
Theses are correct, the only proper notion of truth is a notion of the sort that can be
grasped only after consideration of such doctrines.
Also, as I stated above, among the theoretical merits of the deflationary theories is
(to a varying degree among the theories) simplicity and elegance.  If the deflationist is
moved by the kinds of arguments that have been used to motivate the Denial and
Anomaly Theses, then a revision in the deflationist theory will be required.  The
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deflationist will be forced either to concede that the deflationary theory is only partially
correct, and another theory of the truth of normative and moral discourse is required to
fully characterize truth.  Or perhaps the deflationist will add qualifications to the original
theory in order to either block attribution of truth to moral and normative utterances or
indicate that truth of a different sort is being attributed to these utterances.  To do so
would require reducing the simplicity of such theories, hence removing one of the
appeals of such theory.  The deflationist would be better off affirming the Attribution
Thesis.  In light of the arguments presented above, there are a number of consideration
from outside the deflationary theories themselves that would give the deflationist good
reason to accept the Attribution Thesis.
The Purported Conflict with Expressivism
Perhaps it may still be thought that there is a conflict between deflationist theories
and prominent meta-ethical theories such as expressivism
3
.  A philosopher who would
insist this would miss the fact that the central commitments of expressivists, historically,
have been to points quite distinct from the matter of truth.  Expressivists have been
motivated by a metaphysical view, the view that there are no robust moral facts and
properties in the world, no properties of goodness, rightness, and justice that would figure
into our fundamental causal-explanatory story.  They are also motivated by a view of
motivation, according to which a desire or desire-like mental event is required in order to
explain motivation.  In light of this account of motivation, they present an account of
meaning according to which the meaning of moral terms is explained in terms of the
                                                 
3
 The arguments to the effect that there is such a conflict are in Boghossian 1990 and
Wright 1992.  These arguments have been criticized by Horwich 1993 and Hawthorne
and Price 1996.
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expression of a mental event such as a desire, an emotion, or what Gibbard calls
“expressing a norm.”  None of these points has anything essentially to do with truth, and
any deflationary conception will not require a philosopher to accept or reject any of these
essential commitments of expressivism.  It is important to reiterate, however, that there
would be a tension between the expressivist account of moral facts and properties and a
robust conception of truth.  For on an expressivist account, there would be no robust facts
to which moral utterances would correspond, hence the expressivist correspondence
theorist would be forced to reject a commonsense account of moral talk and practice.
That there is no conflict between expressivism and deflationism has been
recognized in a recent book by the prominent expressivist philosopher Allan Gibbard.
Gibbard suggests that the option is open to the expressivist to accept minimalism, and
attribute truth to moral utterances:
Suppose instead that minimalists are right for truth, and for facts, and for beliefs:
there is no more to claiming “It’s true that pain is bad” than to claim that pain is
bad; the fact that pain is bad just consists in pain’s being bad; to believe that pain
is bad is just to accept that it is.  Then it’s true that pain is bad and it’s a fact that
pain is bad—so long as, indeed, pain is bad.  I genuinely believe that pain is bad,
and my expressivistic theory, filled out, explains what believing this consists in
(Gibbard 2003, 182-183).
If the arguments in this paper for attributing truth to moral utterances are correct, then
expressivists ought not only consider the possibility that a deflationist account of truth is
correct: it would be compulsory for such philosophers to reject any robust account of
truth that would require them to reject common sense regarding moral practice and
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argument.  Rather than being a problem for deflationism, as is widely thought, it is one of
the many benefits of a deflationist account that it allows us to present such an account of
morality.
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